| Article of the 
	  Month - March 2022 | 
		Data Privacy Protection and Geographic Data Use 
		as an Answer to Covid-19
		
			
			Rosario CASANOVA, Carlos Andres CHIALE and Mathilde SARAVIA, Uruguay
		
			
				|  |  |  | 
			
				| Rosario Casanova | Carlos Andrés 
				Chiale | Mathilde Saravia | 
		
		
			
			 
		
			
			This article in .pdf-format (27 pages)
		This
		article aims to reflect on the relevance of geographic data use 
		in the COVID-19 pandemic and its relationshop with the privacy rights of 
		the people involved. 
		
		SUMMARY
		Based on the importance of the concept of proximity or direct contact 
		associated with the spread of the COVID-19 virus, this article aims to 
		reflect on the relevance of geographic data use in this pandemic and its 
		relationship with the privacy rights of the people involved. Thus, this 
		article includes a study of the international and Uruguayan regulations 
		related to geographical and, in particular, localization data.
		Finally, specific considerations about proximity contact applications as 
		a tool for combating COVID-19 are presented, making special emphasis on 
		the Uruguayan case.
		1. INTRODUCTION
		The spread of the COVID-19 or SARS-CoV-2 virus and the consequent 
		declaration of a pandemic, issued by the World Health Organization in 
		March 2020, are now a problem that exceeds the sanitary issue. It brings 
		deep repercussions at an economic, social, political, cultural and 
		environmental level with impacts on the local, regional and global 
		scale. Consequently, the measures or responses implemented by different 
		countries involve different dimensions that affect the lives of their 
		inhabitants. 
		According to recent scientific research, established transmission 
		pathways of SARS-CoV-2 are said to be both, close contact with patients 
		with COVID-19 and the absorption of droplets through the airways (Tan 
		and Wang, 2020). 
		Therefore, the location of a virus carrier is particularly relevant as 
		its proximity to other people is the main factor of infection (Yi, 
		Lagniton, Ye, Li, and Xu, 2020). Thus, geographic data and geomatics 
		tools (GeoSciencie) take a prominent role in addressing this pandemic.
		One of the GIS main strengths is the ability to integrate diverse 
		georeferenced data sets, this facilitates the aggregation of health data 
		with contextual characteristics. There are several academic studies of 
		descriptive models that leverage this capability to examine the 
		geographical associations of COVID-19 with the socio-economic and 
		environmental characteristics of the region. 
		Based on the importance of the concept of proximity or direct contact 
		associated with the spread of the virus, this article proposes a 
		reflection on the role of geographical information as a tool for 
		combating COVID-19 and its relationship with individual and collective 
		law.
		2. USE OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
		Incorporating geographic information science and technology into 
		surveillance, modeling, and response to the COVID-19 pandemic, improves 
		not only the understanding but also the control of the disease.
		This pandemic has highlighted the usefulness of applying geosciences to 
		visualize cases and identify the most vulnerable areas, as well as the 
		use of location-based intelligence tools to improve data representation 
		deficiencies. (Rosenkrantza, Schuurmana, Bellb, & Amramc, 2020).
		Therefore, in this article two different uses of geographic data are 
		presented, one related to mobile applications and the other to the use 
		of the geographical information as response in the fight against this 
		pandemic. 
		2.1 Using Location in Apps
		Nowadays, there is a wide number of mobile applications that require 
		the geolocation of the devices as an input to carry out their function. 
		This is the case of those which allow home delivery (PedidosYa[1], 
		Rappi[2]), request transfer in vehicles (Uber[3]) 
		and even messaging applications in which the location can be sent in 
		real time to other contacts (WhatsApp[4]). All 
		applications that require this type of geolocation ask the user for 
		permission to gather this data.
		
		
		Fig. 1: Screenshot on a mobile device from the 
		PedidosYa app when location use is requested. Source: Own elaboration.
		The use of localization by applications can be diverse. There are 
		many applications in which the user's location data is key for them to 
		operate. On the other hand, there are other applications in which the 
		user's location is not essential but still requested. In those cases, 
		location data is used to promote commercial stores when proximity is 
		detected. In all cases, the use given to this information by application 
		providers is uncertain.
		In this sense, a case that has gained a lot of popularity in Spain 
		refers to LaLiga mobile application. This Spanish football application 
		provides information about football competitions, fixtures, teams, and 
		players as well as national and international results. 
		When using this app, access to the location and microphone of the user's 
		mobile device is requested. With these permissions, the place where the 
		user was watching the game could be clearly identified because the 
		device's microphone and geolocation were activated. With microphone 
		access granted, anytime the user was near a television broadcasting a 
		football game was detected, registering its location. Having gathered 
		this information, it was possible to localize bars and restaurants which 
		broadcasted football matches without paying royalties.
		Consequently, the Spanish Data Protection Agency fined LaLiga with 
		250.000 euros (July 2019) for the intrusion of at least 50.000 
		Spaniards' mobile phones, due to a violation of the principle of 
		transparency in not reporting microphone access in the application.
		This event highlights the risks brought by the misuse of the data 
		accessed by some apps. Although prior consent to have access to location 
		data is requested, users do not always become fully aware of the 
		implications and consequences of this authorization. Thus, it is 
		important to stand out the relevance of including the ethical use of 
		geographic information on the collective agenda.
		2.1  The geoinformation use in the fight against the pandemic
		2.2.1 Exposure Notification
		With the global health emergency as a framework and considering the 
		fact that epidemiological monitoring is thought as a key to contain the 
		pandemic, two leading companies in terms of technology in mobile 
		devices, Apple and Google, joined forces to develop a system that 
		facilitates the crisis monitoring, by sending alerts of proximity to 
		infected users. This system, called exposure notification, is based on 
		the premise of taking care of the security and privacy of users. The app 
		strictly focuses on carrying out the required epidemiological monitoring 
		and does not directly use the user's location data.
		Exposure notifications can then be enabled in different apps on both iOS 
		or Android mobile operating systems. These apps require a strict 
		authorization from Apple and Google in order to provide the user with 
		exposure notifications. Authorization which is only given to official 
		institutions in each country, in the case of Uruguay, the app is called 
		Coronavirus Uy[5]. 
		Exposure notifications do not use location data, they work using 
		bluetooth to share codes with other devices that are nearby and have 
		downloaded and activated this app. Each mobile device constantly 
		broadcasts a random number and simultaneously records those codes coming 
		from nearby devices. (Betarte, et al, 2020). These indicators are stored 
		in each device for 14 days. In the event that a user tests positive for 
		COVID-19, he can inform the application, which will request permission 
		to upload the numbers generated by its device to a central server. Every 
		day, the indicators received by each mobile are compared with those 
		uploaded to the central server and in case of a match, an exposure alert 
		notification will be given. From this alert, each person can use the 
		application to request more information or assistance but can also 
		choose not to tell anyone that they received the alert. 
		From our point of view, exposure alert applications are an efficient and 
		decentralized mechanism for people to collaborate and receive virus 
		exposure alerts quickly, while at the same time, respecting the privacy 
		and willingness of all involved. In the case of Uruguay, the Coronavirus 
		UY application also allows citizens with possible symptoms of the 
		SARS-CoV-2 virus to be connected to health care providers, in order to 
		reduce waiting times for medical attention. Despite the possible 
		efficiency of this application, its success depends exclusively on the 
		population's active use (Cascón, 2020). 
		Although in the next section we will go into the legal aspects, it is 
		important to clarify that all the information collected in the 
		application is covered by the Law on Protection of Personal Data and by 
		the privacy policy of the application itself (Figure 2).
		
		
		Fig. 2: Screenshot of the notification about the 
		exposure alert in the Coronavirus Uy application. Source: Own 
		elaboration.
		2.2.2 COVID-19 situation mapping
		The global understanding of this 
		pandemic´s impact has proportionally grown with the use of mapping apps 
		in public and private sectors. The most popular uses of mapping tools 
		are the daily publications of news agencies or online dashboards in near 
		real time (Boulos and Geraghty, 2020). Although many dashboards have 
		been made, the most widespread example has been developed by the Johns 
		Hopkins University[6]. These maps provide a clear 
		visual representation of the impact of COVID-19 on morbidity and 
		mortality and represent an effective political and social tool to 
		communicate the impact of the disease (Rosenkrantza, et al, 2020).
		
			
3. LEGAL ASPECTS
		
		There is no doubt that the SARS-CoV-2 virus has unleashed a world 
		full of uncertainties, not only about its origins, forms of propagation, 
		treatment, or possible vaccine, but also about the use of individual 
		data as a tool to combat the pandemic. The privacy of data, the ethics 
		in the use of information, particularly geographic information at the 
		service of decision makers, raise many concerns and questions that are 
		not easily answered (Pérez-Colomé, 2020).
		This emergency situation should not imply a suspension of the 
		fundamental right to personal data protection.  Nor could the data 
		protection regulations be used to hinder or limit the effectiveness of 
		the measures adopted by the health authorities. It is possible to think 
		that a dichotomy is being created between individual freedom and 
		community well-being. This discussion is not new but, at this time, is 
		becoming more visible because of globalization, the wide access to 
		international news, the Internet, the rapid spread of the SARS-CoV-2 
		virus, the widespread ignorance and uncertainty about the pandemic 
		itself.
		Therefore, this article includes aspects related to the international 
		and Uruguayan legal framework regarding the privacy of personal data, 
		focusing on the analysis of the protection of location data and the use 
		of geographic information as a tool to combat the pandemic in the 
		country.
		3.1 Personal and sensitive data international legal framework
		The protection of personal data has been the object of regulation of 
		several international treaties to which our country has adhered.  
		However, the approach of such international standards precedes the 
		"Internet" phenomenon, and consequently, although they are an 
		unavoidable antecedent, they do not provide sufficient legal support to 
		modern data traffic in the ICT era. On the other hand, there is no 
		international body that "manages" data privacy on a global scale (Elgar, 
		2011). Consequently, in order to analyze international law on personal 
		data protection, we must resort to comparative law at a regional level 
		(the case of the European Union) and at the national level of some 
		countries, such as the United States and China.
		The protection of personal data in the European Union is presented as 
		the paradigm in the matter and has been a reference for our country. In 
		this sense, it is positioned in the human right to data protection in 
		the digital era by enshrining in the Charter of Fundamental Rights[7] 
		itself that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
		concerning him or her, fair processing, for specific purposes and based 
		on the consent of the person concerned and enshrines the right of 
		everyone to access the data collected concerning him or her and to 
		rectify it.
		Unlike the European system, the United States data protection is 
		regulated on a sectoral basis: it focuses on consumer protection from an 
		economic perspective and not as a personal right. In North American law, 
		data protection is part of the consumer protection law and the 
		supervision of its compliance is a Federal Trade Commission´ 
		responsibility. The Patriot Act of the United States was enacted after 
		the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and enabled security 
		authorities to have access -in suspicious cases-, to local servers’ data 
		stored without a court order. Internet and cloud providers could also be 
		forced to disclose personal data even without informing those affected. 
		In 2015, the United States Freedom Act was enacted again restricting the 
		powers of the investigating authorities.
		However, the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2016[8] 
		prompted the state of California to draft a strict law to protect user 
		data, liable since January 2020. The California Consumer Privacy Act 
		aims to allow consumers to be aware of which companies collect and use 
		their data, as well as to demand, if necessary, to be deleted. In any 
		case, nowadays there is no national law protecting the entire country, 
		but some steps have been taken towards European standards of regulation 
		on data general protection (GDPR-General Data Protection Regulation) 
		(Thielemann, 2020).
		Moreover, another great power such as China does not have, to date, a 
		general data protection law. In 2017, the personal data regulation was 
		given through a Cybersecurity Law that aimed at the network security and 
		strengthening of data protection. The China Cyberspace Administration 
		(CAC), the highest internet administrative law, enacted in June 2019 the 
		Data Protection Regulatory Directive that sets the standards for 
		customer data collection and processing, thus it represents future 
		orientation basis to law. (Thielemann, 2020)
		From the above, it can be concluded that although data privacy issues 
		have been placed on the public agenda, several countries -at a national 
		level as well as the world in its global concept- do not have specific 
		regulations which include all aspects of privacy and data security 
		intimes of pandemic (Cascón, 2020). The following section addresses the 
		study of the Uruguayan case and the relationship between the regulation 
		in force and the geographic and health data use.
		3.2 The protection of personal data in Uruguay
		Uruguay's commitment to personal data protection arises from the 
		ratification of different international instruments that address this 
		issue. Since 1948 Uruguay has ratified the Universal Declaration of 
		Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
		(1966), and at a regional scale, the American Convention of Human Rights 
		Pact of San José, Costa Rica.
		The Uruguayan personal data protection main rule is the Personal Data 
		Protection Law (Law No 18,331)[9] which establishes 
		the right to personal data protection as “inherent to the human person” 
		and refers to the Constitution of the Republic.
		According to the referred law, personal data is defined as "information 
		of any kind referring to specific or determinable natural or legal 
		persons"; this is "... any numerical, alphabetic, graphic, photographic, 
		acoustic or any other information that refers to them."[10]
		In short, personal data is “... any type of information that can 
		directly identify us or makes us identifiable, as our name, address, 
		telephone, identity card, RUT, fingerprint, member number, student 
		number, a photograph or even DNA "
		However, as sensitive data the law considers: "personal data that reveal 
		racial and ethnic origin, political preferences, religious or moral 
		convictions, union affiliation and information regarding health or 
		sexual life."
		In this sense, it is important to specify that as one of the forms of 
		protection the law requires to publicize personal data, the express 
		consent of the person involved must be given and in the case of 
		sensitive data, an express and written consent is required. (Betarte et. 
		Al, 2019).
		Likewise, categories of specially protected data are regulated, such as 
		health and telecommunications data, among others. Regarding health data, 
		the law empowers public or private health institutions and health 
		sciences professionals to “… collect and process personal data related 
		to the physical or mental health of patients who have been under 
		treatment…” provided that professional secrecy principles are complied 
		with, and that the law itself establishes the need for express consent.
		Within this framework, and in accordance with transcribed legal 
		definitions, location data fits into the personal data category, while 
		the data on the health status of a person, such as being infected by 
		COVID-19 must also be considered as sensitive and specially protected 
		data.
		It is clear from the above that location and individual health data are 
		protected by international and national regulations but can be limited 
		when the community health good takes precedence, only with regard to the 
		requirement of prior consent. Limitations that always protect the 
		anonymity of the person so that the security and confidentiality in the 
		treatment of the data is preserved. 
		Therefore, it can be assured that Uruguayan legal requirements, in terms 
		of personal data protection, are at the level of the highest 
		international standards, which is materialized in the imposition of 
		legal obligations to be contemplated in the technical requirements.
		4. CONCLUSIONS
		Even though there are many uncertainties surrounding the pandemic, it 
		is unquestionable that proximity between people is the main factor of 
		contagion, thus the location of an infected person becomes particularly 
		relevant for himself and for others. The spread of infectious diseases 
		is mainly a spatial process; therefore, geospatial data, technologies 
		and analytical methods play a key role in understanding and responding 
		to the COVID-19 disease pandemic.
		The opportunities to incorporate geomatic tools into monitoring, 
		modeling and response to this pandemic, range from developing spatial 
		data infrastructures for surveillance, incorporating mobility data into 
		infectious disease forecasting, using geospatial technologies for 
		digital contact tracing, integrating geographic data into COVID-19 
		modeling, investigating geographical health disparities and social 
		vulnerabilities, and reporting disease status or infrastructure status 
		in order  to return to normal operations.
		Additionally, in recent times, the pandemic daily monitoring has been 
		done through the use of geographic data in dashboards. In this sense 
		Uruguay is not unaware of global activity by implementing its own 
		visualizer (MIRA), in which the number of contagions is daily shown, but 
		with a level of data disaggregation due to protect privacy data of the 
		people involved.
		Regarding normative aspects, for the Uruguayan legal system, the 
		location data falls into the category of personal data whose protection, 
		following the European model, has a fundamental human right status. The 
		location of a person carrying the SARS-CoV-2.2 virus also falls into the 
		specially protected personal data category according to the national law 
		personal data definition. Thus, it is necessary a dual requirement for 
		its diffusion, which is an express and written consent. For this reason, 
		Uruguay has national regulations that strongly protect and ensure the 
		protection of individual and health data.
		The geographic data used as a spatial analysis tool to support public 
		decision-making in the fight against the pandemic are also protected in 
		Uruguay, since the anonymity of those affected is preserved. While this 
		is a strength, it can also be a weakness since it limits the generation 
		of academic specific research. This impact can be minimized by providing 
		these data with a higher level of disaggregation, as the one used for 
		the national population and housing censuses (in which the anonymity of 
		the data is also protected).
		According to this research and regarding other location data apps, we 
		can state that the registration of contacts via bluetooth used in the 
		proximity alert applications, is the most advanced technique and also 
		the one that works best for tracking those who are infected. This tool 
		is not only recommended in terms of its positional quality, but also and 
		mainly, because it is more efficient in protecting individual privacy.  
		In particular, the Coronavirus Uy application plays a fundamental role 
		since it provides the above-mentioned benefits and, at the touch of a 
		button, professional healthcare assistance to the community in general 
		and to those infected in particular. Additionally, it is a tool that 
		solves, or at least gives a very big and invisible hand, to the weakest 
		link in the fight against COVID-19, which is the "epidemiological 
		monitoring".
		From a legal point of view, the application complies with the 
		requirements of express and written authorization, requested in national 
		regulations. Since it requires the user´s consent: specifically, the 
		willingness and action to communicate that they contracted the virus and 
		the acceptance of generating an alert for exposure to the users of the 
		application who were close.
		In other words, from our point of view, proximity alert tools are very 
		suitable and comply with people's privacy rules. Therefore, it is a 
		recommended tool to be used in several countries, even if they do not 
		have a specific national regulation that protects the privacy of 
		personal data.
		It is fair to say that while the tool has these strengths, it has a 
		great weakness that refers to the need for massive use by all residents. 
		A fact that can be a problem because it requires mobile phones that 
		support this technology and users who know how to use them properly.
		In any case, these limitations can be overcome, but a strong public 
		policy is required to promote, train, facilitate and ensure that a very 
		high percentage of the inhabitants use it. To this end, strong 
		communication campaigns, training plans, problem-solving centers for 
		users, and even the possibility of designing and constructing simple 
		special devices, free of charge for the inhabitants, created solely to 
		fulfill the functions of data exchange and proximity alerts, could be 
		considered. The academy has a lot to contribute in this sense.
		
		[1] Web site of Pedidos Ya:
		https://www.pedidosya.com.uy/
		[2] Web site of Rappi:
		https://www.rappi.com.uy/
		[3] Web site of Uber: 
		https://www.uber.com/
		[4] Web site of Whatsapp:
		https://www.whatsapp.com/
		[5] Web site of Coronavirus Uy:
		
		https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/politicas-y-gestion/informacion-sobre-aplicacion-coronavirus
		[6] 
		Web site of the Dashboard of John Hopkins University:
		
		https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
		[7] The Charter of Fundamental Rights is a 
		document including a set of personal, civil, political, economic and 
		social rights of citizens and residents of the European Union, 
		proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union 
		and the European Commission in December 2000.  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_es.pdf
		[8] Cambridge Analytica is a data analysis 
		company that accessed data from 87 million Facebook users.
		[9] Law of Personal Data, Law 18331 of August 
		11, 2008: 
		https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18331-2008
		[10] Regulatory Decree (of the Law) No. 414/009 
		of August 31, 2009:
		
		https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/414-2009/40
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		BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
		Rosario Casanova (Uruguay) is a Land Surveyor 
		Engineering, expert in geomatics, geo-technologies, urban planning, she 
		has a master's degree and a doctorate in these areas.
		Since 1994 she is a professor at the Institute of Land Surveying of the 
		Faculty of Engineering of the University of the Republic, Uruguay. Being 
		the Director of the Institute of Surveying from 2014 to March of this 
		year.
		She is the chair of the United Nations Academic Network for the Americas 
		for Geospatial Data Management (UN-GGIM) since it was created in 2017.
		She has served as professor in the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
		(LILP) in the Latin America and Caribbean Program and carried out 
		several research projects on the informal land market.
		She has presented research in regional and international events.
		 
		Carlos Chiale (Uruguay) has graduated as Cartography 
		Technologist (2015) in  the University of the Republic, Uruguay, and as 
		Bachelor degree of Sytems (2020) in ORT University. 
		He works as consultant in information in National Emergency System of 
		Uruguay.
		He is a member of Geomatic Department at Surveying 
		Institute, Engineering Faculty of the University of the Republic, 
		Uruguay.
		 
		Matilde Saravia (Uruguay) has graduated as a lawyer 
		(2006) and as planning and urban development magister (2017) in the 
		University of the Republic. She has specialized herself in planning, 
		integrated water management and environment since 2009 and she works as 
		a consultant in these areas. She is a member of the Technical Legal 
		Department of the Land Surveyor Institute, Engineering Faculty, 
		University of the Republic.
		CONTACTS
		Rosario Casanova
		Instituto de Agrimensura, Facultad de Ingeniería, Universidad de la 
		República.Montevideo
		URUGUAY
		 
		Carlos Andrés Chiale
		Instituto de Agrimensura, Facultad de Ingeniería, Universidad de la 
		República.
		Montevideo
		URUGUAY
		 
		Matilde Saravia
		Instituto de Agrimensura, Facultad de Ingeniería, Universidad de la 
		República.
		Montevideo
		URUGUAY
		Email: matildes@fing.edu.uy